http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe7.html
Op-ed
They need some serious letters about serious subjects. For example Croatians
in Vojvodina and Boka and Bosnia Herzegovina
nb
Croatia
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
President Stipe Mesic’s government often failed to confront entrenched ethnic
Croat nationalists obstructing reform, particularly on issues of impunity for
war-time abuses and the return of Serb refugees. The Parliament approved
constitutional changes reducing presidential authority and abolishing the
upper house of Parliament in November 2000 and March 2001 respectively. In
local elections held throughout the country on May 20 nationalist parties
made significant gains in some areas. Police intervention was required in
some areas, such as Vojnic, where ethnic Croat nationalist demonstrators
tried to keep elected Croatian Serbs from assuming office.
Croatia’s first census since 1991 took place on March 31, 2001. Some Croatian
Serb organizations protested that the government did not do enough to include
Croatian Serb refugees in the Fedral Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the count. Serbian Democratic Forum (Srpski Demokratski Forum,
SDF), a Croatian NGO, distributed over 50,000 census forms abroad.
Comprehensive statistics were not available at this writing, but preliminary
results indicated that Croatian Serbs made up approximately 5 percent of the
population of 4.38 million in 2001, compared to approximately 12 percent in
1991.
Optimism over the extent of Croatia’s cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cooled when the ICTY’s
chief prosecutor reported to the U.N. Security Council in November 2000 that
the government’s cooperation was unsatisfactory, particularly in providing
access to documents requested by the tribunal.
Demands by opposition parties to cease cooperation with the ICTY resurfaced
in June, after the ICTY issued indictments against Croatian generals Rahim
Ademi and Ante Gotovina. Opposition rhetoric cooled after the government,
standing by its commitment to cooperate with the ICTY, survived a vote of
confidence in July. General Ademi, indicted for killing at least thirty-eight
people and other abuses committed by troops under his command in the Medak
pocket near Gospic in 1993, surrendered voluntarily to the ICTY in July. At
the time of writing, General Gotovina, indicted for killings, house
destruction, and other abuses against Croatian Serbs in 1995 remained at
large. The ICTY also publicly charged Yugoslav and Serb personnel for abuses
committed in Croatia in 1991. In October, the ICTY published a previously
sealed indictment against four members of the Yugoslav People’s Army and Navy
for crimes committed during attacks on the Dubrovnik region. Two of them,
Pavle Strugar and Miodrag Jokic, surrendered to the tribunal in November.
Also in October, the ICTY amended its indictment of former Serbian president
Slobodan Milosevic to include charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity for the killings, torture, imprisonment, deportation, and other
crimes amounting to persecution of the Croat and other non-Serb population of
Croatia in 1991.
Progress was also made on domestic accountability efforts. In February,
Croatian authorities expanded their investigation into the killing of
approximately forty Croatian Serb civilians in the Gospic area in 1991,
naming as a suspect former Croatian Army general Mirko Norac, who reportedly
ordered the formation of a firing squad. Protesters took to the streets to
oppose General Norac’s or ICTY involvement in his trial. The ICTY prosecutor
had not indicted General Norac, however, and she decided not to request that
the Croatian court cede jurisdiction to the international tribunal. In June,
Croatian authorities arrested Fikret Abdic, the leader of the wartime
breakaway Bihac pocket of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and charged him with war
crimes. Bosnian authorities had long sought his arrest, but his Croatian
citizenship prevented his extradition under Croatian law. In August, Croatian
authorities in Bjelovar detained four men, accusing them of killing Croatian
Serb civilians and prisoners of war in 1991. In September, six former
military police were arrested on charges of torturing and killing non-Croat
detainees in the Lora military prison in Split in 1991.
Croatian authorities also pursued war-crimes charges against Croatian Serbs.
The OSCE noted a substantial increase in such cases, many of which involved
defendants arrested pursuant to longstanding dormant indictments. Although
some suspects were refugees arrested when attempting to return to Croatia,
others had been present in Croatia for years. In many cases charges were
subsequently dropped, raising suspicions that the arrests were politically
founded and arbitrary. When three men from Glina were arrested in March on
the basis of a 1993 war-crimes indictment, the alleged witnesses, who had
been tortured at a detention center, were unable to identify any of the three
as having been present at the scene of the crimes. At least two of the
suspects had been living in Croatia for over a year and one had regularized
his status as a returnee with the authorities. Although these men were
acquitted, fear of such arrests deterred many Croatian Serb men from
returning to Croatia.
Obstacles to the return of Croatian Serb refugees remained a significant
human rights concern. Although by August 2001 over 100,000 Croatian Serbs had
returned according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, most were
elderly. According to international organizations, significant numbers of
these returnees may have again departed for the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia or Bosnia-Herzegovina after only a short stay in Croatia.
Human rights violations contributed to the reluctance of refugees to return
and to their renewed flight. While violent attacks on Croatian Serbs
continued to decrease in frequency, isolated serious incidents contributed to
apprehension about return. Croatian authorities frequently condemned
ethnically motivated attacks and opened investigations, but arrests or
judicial proceedings did not always follow.
A complicated web of discriminatory and confusing legislation meant that few
Croatian Serbs were able to repossess their pre-war homes or obtain governme
nt reconstruction assistance. Although the Croatian authorities acknowledged
the difficulties and modified some legislation, in many cases these changes
simply exacerbated confusion over implementation. For example, the
reconstruction law had excluded housing destroyed by “terrorist acts” from
reconstruction (a category the authorities often used to describe the tens of
thousands of Croatian Serb properties burned and looted following Croatian
military operations in 1995). Although this provision of the law was
repealed, some county offices refused to consider such applications, claiming
that the amended reconstruction legislation contradicted other laws. With few
exceptions, courts also failed to rule favorably in repossession cases where
the prewar housing had been socially owned and occupancy rights revoked
because the residents were absent as refugees or internally displaced
persons. There were no mechanisms for compensating people deprived of such
property rights.
Even when their property rights were recognized, Croatian Serbs also faced
discriminatory practices when attempting to physically repossess their
property. For example, in most jurisdictions, officials failed to implement
court decisions, particularly with regard to evictions of ethnic Croats from
Croatian Serb property. Although the authorities acknowledged this common
problem, they failed to condemn even the most flagrant cases, nor did they
take action against officials who refused to implement the law.
DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Croatia’s vibrant civil society continued to make an active contribution to
public life despite legislation restricting associations. In a serious but
isolated incident, lawyer Srdj Jaksic of Dubrovnik, who was known for taking
on human rights cases, was shot and injured shortly after his Montenegrin
client accused of war crimes was acquitted in December 2000. At the time of
writing, there had been no substantial progress in the investigation.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
United Nations
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights decided in April 2001 to exclude Croatia
from the mandate of its special representative on the former Yugoslavia. The
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights maintained a field presence
in Croatia, however, focusing primarily on technical assistance to the
authorities. In March, the Human Rights Committee considered Croatia’s
initial report on implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. While commending Croatia on constitutional reforms, the
committee criticized the continued impunity for killings and torture
committed during the armed conflict. The U.N. observer mission in Prevlaka
was extended until January 2002. In May, Croatia ratified the Statute of the
International Criminal Court.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
In June, the OSCE Mission to Croatia reported to the Permanent Council on
Croatia’s progress in meeting its international commitments, highlighting the
continuing obstacles to the sustainable return of Croatian Serb refugees. The
mission’s mandate was extended until December 2001, although staff numbers
were reduced in June.
Council of Europe
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published its second
report on Croatia in July. It found that despite the good will of national
authorities, discrimination endured, particularly against Croatian Serbs in
war-affected areas, but also against Roma.
European Union
Croatia further advanced its ties to the European Union, in May initialing a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, establishing favorable economic and
trade relations and cooperation in justice and internal affairs. The European
Union also continued to provide significant reconstruction and development
aid to war-affected areas.
United States
Continuing its support for moderate and non-nationalist reforms, the United
States funded reconstruction and demining efforts, as well as development and
technical assistance. The U.S. Agency for International Development did not
directly engage in housing reconstruction, but it did fund community
infrastructure and other projects.
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